Tribes in Northeast Syria: between co-optation and emancipation

As the future of the Syrian state remains unclear, Arab tribes have found themselves caught up in the tensions between the self-proclaimed and Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) and the newly-installed and Islamist-led transitional government in Damascus.

The socio-political landscape of Northeast Syria is a complex fabric of communities and armed groups. Tribes, who are often perceived as social structures representing solid forms of hierarchy and solidarity, can also shift allegiances or split their own leaderships across time when  subjected to external influences. Under the rule of Bashar al-Assad, tribes were generally weakened to enable the Ba’ath regime to dominate the Euphrates basin. Later, during the civil war, they quickly became an effective structure to mobilize fighters under different banners.

Pragmatism and personal ambitions

In the early years of the war, the powerful al-Shammar tribal confederation, which spans across Iraq and Syria, was quick to arm and gather hundreds of fighters to counter the Islamic State (ISIS) in the al-Jezirah region. “Our men were at the forefront of opposing ISIS. The Shammar mobilized to seek revenge for the killing of some of our fellow tribesmen but also to help other communities such as the Yazidis facing genocide in Sinjar by allying with the Kurdish combatants of the YPG (People’s Defense Units) and YPJ (Women’s Defense Units)”, described Manaa ibn Humaydi al-Hadi, the influential leader of the Shammar confederation, in an interview in his hometown of Ain Talo.

The alliance between what, with time, came to be the AANES and the al-Shammar confederation has not faltered through time; it remains sturdy. At the moment, several thousand al-Shammar fighters are still mobilized in the Sanadid militia. Most of them have integrated into the ranks and answer orders of the commanders of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the multiethnic military force of the AANES . As for other tribes, collaboration with the Kurdish-led forces was not always intuitive.

Shayk Manaa ibn Humaydi al Hadi | Photo by: Santiago Montag

“Beyond tribalism, there is a fundamental political issue. In Deir ez-Zor, the Kurdish commanders were quite masterful at using tribal grievances against ISIS. For example,  the Shaitat tribe suffered more than a thousand executions by the Islamic State in 2014, as the terrorist organization relied on rival tribal structures such as the Amr Rafdan section from the Bukayr tribe in the Euphrates basin. But by relying on specific tribal structures to undermine others, the SDF also risks seeing their antagonists return to support their rivals. Never ideological but rather pragmatic, tribes’ collaboration with the SDF was also a way for mid-ranking sheikhs to obtain promotions within their tribes by mobilizing their kin” detailed Felix Legrand, an independent Researcher specializing in tribal dynamics in Northeast Syria, who recently returned from a fieldwork trip in the region. Yet, now that the old regime’s menace is gone, the SDF face new challenges.

Photo by: Santiago Montag

Defections and tensions

In the Euphrates basin, various tribal structures recently defected from the SDF. “The defections mostly occurred in the Manbij and Deir ez-Zor military councils. In the case of the latter, several leaders of the Shaitat tribe (Ogaidat clan) abandoned post”, explained  Dr. Legrand. Most returned to their homes in Deir ez-Zor areas formerly under Assad’s control, such as al Bou Kamal, near the Iraqi border. A lot of them believe that the SDF’s days are numbered. Indeed, the disappearance of the Ba’athist threats in Syria led many to consider the SDF and, by extension, the AANES as obsolete structures.

After defections in late 2024, less tribal, mixed Kurdish and Arab security units were hastily set up by the SDF, thereby bypassing the local military councils which rely on tribal structures. In ar-Raqqa, the researcher added, local brigades were at some point completely removed and replaced with units from Afrin, made up of Kurds who had recently been displaced by the advance of Turkish-backed Syrian National Army in the Shahba and Manbij areas, north of Aleppo. Meanwhile, a curfew was imposed in ar-Raqqa, the same city that ISIS had proclaimed as its capital.

Despite their discipline, these mixed units have less field experience and social connections in the Deir ez-Zor and ar-Raqqa areas. This, in turn, leads to more tensions with local populations.  Furthermore, these newly deployed units are less capable of fighting against the remaining ISIS sleeper cells in these areas, while the terrorist group managed to rely on some forms of tribal solidarity to maintain its low-intensity struggle against the SDF.

“By undermining the tribal realities of the areas where they fight ISIS, the SDF is at risk of losing ground”, noted Dr. Legrand who conducted several studies on the issue of tribal cooptation in the region. Eventually, local security forces were redeployed in the ar-Raqqa area to avoid further alienating the population, the researcher added.

Photo by: Santiago Montag

Agents of mediation and legitimacy

To prevent more manpower drain and tribal defections, the AANES resorted to creating public relation offices to mediate with local tribesmen and hear people’s pleas. These weekly mediations are sometimes attended by US representatives.

On a political level, the AANES has long acknowledged that the tribes are an irreplaceable structure . It does not hesitate to mobilize renowned tribal figures to express their solidarity with the autonomous self-administration. This has been the case with leaders from the Tayy and Baggara tribes, who regularly appear at the forefront to defend the AANES in the face of criticism.

On a more local level, tribal leaders are crucial actors of reconciliation, especially within former ISIS strongholds. Many of them lobby for the release of ISIS detainees and vouch that these will not return to committing crimes. The security branch of the al-Hasakah prison receives tribal figures on a weekly basis.

A missed opportunity

Overall, the AANES may have missed the opportunity to apprehend the tribal factor to its true potential. There was a lot to achieve with local tribes who are generally suspicious of central power. While the AANES’s rhetoric is focused on decentralization, it failed to mobilize tribal elements in this direction to pressure either the Ba’ath regime in the past or the transitional government today. 

“After [the Ba’ath regime’s] decades-long marginalization of the resource-rich Eastern Euphrates areas, tribes could have been the key to securing some form of decentralization from Damascus. But this could have only been addressed if the Kurdish leadership had developed serious policy-making mechanisms with tribal factions. Instead, it remained centered around its own cultural and political project”, added Dr. Legrand.

Photo by: Santiago Montag

The Kurdish leadership in Rojava has indeed been criticized in Northeast Syria for having initiated negotiations with Damascus without any form of consultation with other components of the social fabric of the region, all while various Arab and Kurdish leaders are regularly featured in public events to legitimize the image of diversity in AANES institutions.

“Overall, the largely Kurdish leadership of the AANES has not managed to create a general adhesion to its autonomous project among the Arab societal components despite their desire to be more involved”, described Dr. Legrand. The feeling of Kurdish supremacy in the region never faltered as Kurds are often perceived as instrumentalizing anti-terrorism actions to enlarge their territory in Syria. Meanwhile, the vast majority of Arabs in ar-Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor are willing to reintegrate into the central state—although gradually,to avoid the chaos that erupted in Manbij, where the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army-affiliated militias wreaked havoc in the region.

Despite these difficulties, the AANES remains committed to peaceful and inclusive dialogue. The recent conference held in al-Hasakah on 8 August, 2025  showed that it remains capable of mobilizing a large spectrum of Syria’s civil society around a message of coexistence and unity, within a decentralized Syria beyond the autonomous region. Various tribal factions also participated in the event. Despite its inclusive and constructive discourse , the conference was received negatively by the central government, which threatened to put an end to political negotiations with the AANES.

Despite this unstable environment, the AANES and the new rulers of Syria managed to engage in long and uncertain negotiations, while also securing a ceasefire with the most hostile factions of the Turkey-led Syrian National Army. Amid this situation, tribal actors—traditional or newly empowered— could play a significant role. Whether this impact can facilitate a normalization of relations between the AANES and Damascus or lead to the weakening of either remains to be seen.